affinity (attractiveness) as the membership increases. The banking sector is modeled as a homogenous Cournot oligopoly; banks interact strategically with each other but not with the credit unions. The third section describes the dataset and the variables we use. The fourth section presents the econometric methods we employ and our empirical results. The fifth section draws conclusions. Three appendixes appear at the end of the paper, detailing the data, construction of variables, and the econometric methodology, respectively.
Competition Between For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Financial Institutions
Two important papers by Moore (1996, 1998) provide a comparative analysis of the governance structures and incentives facing cooperatives and firms with outside ownership.
Hart and Moore conclude that firms with outside ownership typically operate more efficiently in competitive environments. However, if members of a cooperative have preferences that are sufficiently homogeneous, then the cooperative firm makes better decisions (in a welfare sense) than the firm with outside ownership. Thus, both types of governance structure might be expected to appear in modern economies. Our paper focuses on the competition between these two types of institutions in the marketplace. We provide a theoretical model of competition between for-profit and not-for-profit institutions, and then we put this model to the test empirically in retail banking markets across the United States.
There is a large and growing literature investigating competition among retail banks (for example, see Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) ; Amel and Hannan (1998) ; Prager and Hannan (1998); Cohen and Mazzeo (2004) ). However, very little research focuses on the possible interactions between credit unions and banks (Hannan and Liang (1995) , Hannan (2003) ). The remainder of this section briefly discusses the importance of concentration ratios in retail banking markets and whether credit unions are important for banking competition.
A. Banking Market Concentration, Prices, and Profits
The number of commercial bank charters in existence has declined by between three and five percent annually since 1988, resulting in a nine-year cumulative disappearance of 33 percent of all bank charters (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) , Tables 1 and 2 ). The trend has continued to the present day, with a spate of large bank merger announcements in early 2004.
Mergers accounted for about 84 percent of disappearances and failures for 16 percent during 1988-97. Local deposit-market concentration actually declined slightly over this period, however. Average commercial-bank deposit Herfindahl indexes in metropolitan statistical areas fell from 0.2020 to 0.1949, and those in non-metropolitan counties fell from 0.4317 to 0.4114 (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) , Table 1 ). Meanwhile, credit-union membership grew more than 38 percent in the decade ending in 1996, while the country's population grew about 10 percent (U.S. Treasury (1997), p. 24).
Does market concentration matter for prices and profits? In a non-banking context, Tirole notes that, "[m]ost cross-sectional analyses find a weak but statistically significant link between concentration and profitability (1988, p. 222) ." With regard to banking markets, Gilbert (1984) concluded in an early review of the empirical literature that the economic significance of market concentration by banks before deregulation was very difficult to assess, not least because of the poor quality of much of the empirical research. More recently, Shaffer (1992) summarized the (lack of) current consensus by stating that the degree to which banking market structure matters for competition and performance is "a hotly debated topic."
B. Credit Unions in the Analysis of Banking Competition
The primary focus of bank antitrust enforcement in the merger-review process carried out by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and by federal bank regulators (the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) is "the availability of banking services, including loans and credit, to small and medium-sized businesses" (Nanni, 1998, p. 193) . This focus on the availability of small-business credit means that credit unions, which serve the household sector almost exclusively, are routinely ignored for purposes of regulatory analysis of banking market competition.
Compounding the problem of defining and measuring the relevant market, the only comprehensive local market data available are annual observations of commercial bank and thrift deposits.
1 It has been difficult to find direct empirical evidence that credit unions matter in banking markets. Amel and Hannan (1998) conclude, on the basis of empirically estimated residual deposit supply elasticities, that commercial banks in a local market continue to be their own most relevant competitors. That is, it does not appear that non-local or non-bank financial institutions, such as out-of-market banks, credit unions, other thrift institutions, finance companies, or providers of money-market mutual funds, are important determinants of deposit rate-setting behavior by banks. Emmons and Schmid (2000) find that higher levels of banking concentration in a local deposit market are associated with higher participation rates at occupational credit unions.
There is at least some indirect evidence that credit unions matter to banks, however.
Bankers themselves frequently complain about (possibly unfair) competition from credit unions.
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Banks have collectively spent large sums of money lobbying Congress to inhibit credit-union expansion. Thus, there is at least a reasonable presumption that banks view credit unions as competitors in at least some of their market segments, such as the market for household deposits.
A Model of Competition between Banks and Credit Unions
In this section we present a model of spatial competition between for-profit commercial banks and not-for-profit credit unions. We assume that credit unions compete with banks but not with each other. Banks interact strategically with each other, forming a homogenous oligopoly. Similar to Salop (1979) , but with important differences, we model competition between banks and credit unions as a two-stage game. In the first stage, households decide on whether to join credit unions. Credit unions establish and produce financial services for their members; these services are consumed upon production. Then, in a second stage, banks enter the market and compete for the residual demand. The residual demand is for financial services of those households that decided not to join a credit union in the first stage. Banks compete strategically with Cournot conjectural variation. New banks continue to enter the market until an additional competitor could not operate profitably were it to enter the market. To enter, a bank must expect nonnegative profits. Due to the indivisibility in the number of banks, profit typically is positive (but never negative).
We assume that households have rational expectations and, hence, fully understand the economy that we model. There is no uncertainty. When the households make their membership decision in the first stage, they anticipate correctly the price that banks will charge for financial services in the second stage.
In what follows, we first discuss household preferences. Next, we introduce credit unions, then banks. Finally, we derive testable hypotheses related to competition between banks and credit unions.
A. Household Preferences
Household preferences are modeled as locations on a circle of unit length, as introduced by Salop (1979) . The circle is covered by a continuum of households, which are identical except for their preferences for financial services. Each household's unique preferences correspond to the household's unique location on the circle. Bundles of services provided in locations other than at the household's address do not fully match its preferences. The more distant these bundles are, the less the household prefers them. The household can consume such bundles through costly traveling in preference space (along the circle).
Banks offer the full range of financial services. This allows banks to match any household's preferences, making these financial institutions ubiquitous on the circle. Credit unions, on the other hand, offer only a limited set of services. Because credit unions are unable to offer every household its most preferred bundle, these organizations exist only at discrete points.
The locations of the credit unions on the circle define their common bonds, which are occupational in nature. There are N common bonds, each comprising an equally large, contiguous segment (arc) on the circle. Because the common bond is defined by the households' affiliation with the credit union's sponsor, we implicitly assume that household proximity in preference spacethis includes preferences with respect to geographic locationcorrelates with the employment relation.
B. Credit Union Sector
Credit unions operate as not-for-profit institutions; they are identical except for their locations on the unit circle. We assume that credit unions produce financial services with constant marginal costs, v . We model credit union sponsorship as the employer absorbing the credit union's fixed costs, for instance, by providing free office space and free time for employees who volunteer their services. Thus, the price of a unit of financial services equals the marginal cost of production. , comprises all households j within the potential membershipthe common bondfor which the following inequality holds:
Equation (1) shows that membership in a credit union is worthwhile for the household only if the credit union's price of financial services is sufficiently lower than the price charged by a bank; this is to offset the travel costs to the credit union.
We define * r as the distance to the credit union of the marginal member, that is, the household that is indifferent between joining the credit union and buying its financial services at a commercial bank. For * j r r = , equation (1) The credit union participation rate is defined as m N ⋅ the fraction of the household continuum on the circle that joins credit unions. Equation (2) shows that, the higher is the anticipated price for banking services, b p , the higher is the credit union participation rate, all else being equal.
C. Banking Sector
There are K identical banks; this number is determined endogenously in the second stage. Costs of entry to, and exit from, the banking sector are zero. The banks face the residual demand for financial servicesthat is, the demand of all households that did not join a credit union in the first stage. The following demand function defines this residual market:
Unlike credit unions, banks are ubiquitous and, consequently, their markets are not segmented. Thus, each bank faces the total residual market. Also, since banks are homogenous, there is a uniform price for bank services.
We assume that each bank follows a Cournot conjecturethat is, each bank assumes that any variation of its own output will not affect the output chosen by any other bank. The profit of bank , ,..., x , subject to the assumed conjectural variation. The bank's first-order condition is:
Solving the first-order condition for b j
x and aggregating over all K banks delivers the supply of financial services of the banking sector:
Substituting aggregate demand (3) into aggregate supply (6) delivers the market-clearing quantity of financial services provided by the banks:
Because the costs of entry and exit are zero, we impose a zero-profit condition on the banking industry. Solving equation (6) for b p w − and inserting it into the zero-profit condition delivers the equilibrium number of banks:
where floor is an operator that rounds down to the nearest integer. Equation (8) This leads to the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Retail banking concentration is a non-decreasing function of credit union participation.
Further, equation (8) shows that the relation between retail banking concentration and credit union participation is dependent on households' demand functions and bank cost function parameters or, more generally, on local economic conditions. This suggests another testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The relation between retail banking concentration and credit union participation is a function of local economic conditions.
In what follows, we test these hypotheses, using annual, county-level data from the period 1989-2001. In this empirical analysis, each county constitutes a unit circle.
Data and Definition of Variables
In this section, we offer a description of the dataset and variables employed in the empirical analysis. For details on the data sources and the construction of the dataset see This weighting scheme corresponds to current methods for assessing retail banking concentration by federal regulatory agencies. Credit unions currently are excluded from anti-trust analysis.
We measure credit union participation as the weighted average of the participation rates of individual credit unions operating in a given county; the weights are derived from the number of potential members. The set of credit unions comprises all federally chartered and federally insured occupational institutions. 3 We control for local economic conditions by including personal income per capita and population density (population per square mile) as explanatory variables. These two variables serve as proxies for the household demand function and bank cost function parameters in equation (8). 4 We do not include counties (or independent cities) where there is only one bank (17 county-years) or where there is no credit union (which applies to about two-thirds of the counties and independent cities in any given year). All variables are used in Concentration ratios generally fell during this period of frequent bank mergers because many combinations were of the "market-extension" type. That is, the number of banks decreased in the country as a whole, while new competitors were entering local markets by means of acquisition.
If a new entrantthat is, an acquiring bankincreases its share of the new market, the Herfindahl index of the targeted market can decline even as the number of independent banks in the country as a whole decreases. The number of counties (and independent cities) for which values of the Herfindahl index are calculated varies slightly from year to year because we discard county-years with corner solutions, that is, observations where there are no credit unions or where there is only a single bank.
Empirical Methodology and Results
In order to account for the potentially nonlinear influence of local economic conditions and non-vanishing cross-derivatives, we estimate the following nonlinear model:
where i y is the logarithmic Herfindahl index of local bank deposits of county i for a given year, and ε is a normally distributed error term with mean 0 and constant, finite variance, 2 σ . The vector i z comprises the observations of the three explanatory variables (credit union participation, personal income per capita, population density) and the value 1 (the constant regressor) for county i in a given year.
We have no specific hypotheses concerning precisely how local economic conditions, as gauged by personal income per capita and population density, might affect the household and bank cost parameters of the reduced form of our theoretical model, equation (8). Potentially, both variables affect the demand side and the supply side, possibly in a nonlinear manner. This leads us to be conservative in the restrictions we impose on the econometric model. Also, hypothesis 2
states that local economic conditions, which we gauge by these two variables, bear on the relation between retail banking concentration and credit union participation; this implies non-vanishing cross-derivatives.
We estimate model (9) using locally weighted regression (LOESS), as developed by . LOESS is a multi-dimensional smoother that can accommodate not only non-vanishing second derivatives, but also non-vanishing cross-derivatives. In other words, LOESS can accommodate arbitrarily smooth influences of the explanatory variables without imposing the constraint that these influences be linear or additive. As shown by Cleveland, Devlin, and Grosse (1988) , LOESS can reproduce peaks and is insensitive to asymmetrically distributed data. What is more, LOESS has many desirable statistical properties, as reviewed in Hastie and Tibshirani (1990) and Goodall (1990) . More recently, Fan (1992) has shown that locally linear regression smoothers, such as LOESS, have high asymptotic efficiency.
Unlike many other smoothers, locally linear regression is not liable to "boundary effects" that might arise from the lack of a neighborhood on one side of a given data point. For details on the econometric method, see Appendix C.
A. Model Selection and Analysis of Variance
We approach the testing of our hypotheses as a model-selection problem. Starting from the unconstrained model (9), we impose restrictions and test their significance in an analysis of variance. For an analysis of variance to be valid, the fitted values ŷ of the unrestricted model must be unbiased. Under the null hypothesis, the fitted values of the restricted model also are unbiased (Hastie and Tibshirani (1990) ).
We start by determining a specification of model (9) that can be assumed to deliver unbiased estimates of the dependent variable; this specification then will serve as the unrestricted model in the analysis of variance. In the LOESS estimation technique, the specification choice is a problem of selecting the smoothing parameter, g the fraction of sample observations included in the estimation of the functional form around a given data point. The larger the smoother parameter, 0 1 g < ≤ , the smoother is this estimated functional form, possibly at the expense of a bias in the fitted values.
Cross-validation, a commonly used technique for determining the smoothing parameter (or bandwidth, in kernel estimation) does not offer a solution to our specification problem. This is because cross-validation minimizes the average mean squared error, deliberately trading off some variance for a bias (Li (1990); Andrews (1991) ). Instead, we employ the M-plot method suggested by . This technique, which is derived from Mallows' We estimate model (10) using LOESS with the backfitting algorithm developed by Hastie and Tibshirani (1986) ; for details on the estimating method, see Appendix C.
The analysis of variance used for testing the restrictions associated with the null hypotheses rests on an F-statistic that is derived from a two-moment 2 χ -approximation ; this F-statistic is detailed in Appendix C. Table 4 capita is set at its 25th percentile, and so is population density. In the center plot, these two explanatory variables are held at their median values, and in the southeastern plot, they are held at their respective 75th percentiles. Thus, the influence on retail banking concentration of personal income per capita and population density can be read from the differences across plots of the graphically displayed relation between retail banking concentration and credit union participation.
Furthermore, the specific influences on retail banking concentration of personal income per capita and population density are visible in Panels B and C, respectively. In each of these panels, the level of the explanatory variable varies on the horizontal axes as described above for the participation rate. These panels show that, all else held equal, retail banking concentration is increasing and convex in personal income per capita (Panel B) and is "u-shaped" in population density (Panel C).
Panel A of Table 5 shows that retail banking concentration is an increasing function of the credit union participation rate (supporting Hypothesis 1) and that the functional form varies with local economic conditions (supporting Hypothesis 2). For instance, for low values of personal income per capita and low population densitycharacteristic of many rural countiesthere is essentially no relation between retail banking concentration and credit union participation (northwestern plot). This is different for counties with high population density but low income per capita (southwestern plot), where retail banking concentration is an increasing function of credit union participation. Even stronger is the influence of credit union participation on retail banking concentration for counties where both population density and personal income per capita are high (southeastern plot); this combination is characteristic of many metropolitan areas. The findings for the other 12 years look similar; chart 6 exhibits the results for 1989.
Conclusion
Credit unions are a growing part of the retail financial landscape in the United States.
Credit union expansion is a controversial issue, particularly among bank and thrift owners and managers. The strength of opposition by these interested parties alone provides some indirect evidence that credit unions are relevant competitors to banks in some market segments of retail financial services.
This paper models competition in local deposit markets between for-profit and not-for-profit financial institutions. For-profit retail banks may offer a superior bundle of financial services, but not-for-profit (occupational) credit unions enjoy sponsor subsidies that allow them to capture a share of the local market. The model predicts that greater participation in credit unions in a given county will be associated with higher levels of retail-banking concentration. We find evidence of a positive relationship between county-level participation rates in occupational credit unions and the county's bank deposit market concentration.
The ability of credit unions to affect local banking market structure supports the presumption of current banking antitrust analysis that retail-banking markets remain local. We also identify several local economic factors that modulate the nature of bank-credit union competition, including income per capita and population density. We excluded credit union observations for any of the following reasons:
-Missing TOM codes -Activity codes other than "active" -Number of members or of potential members not greater than one; applies to actual and to lagged values -Non-positive values for total assets or lagged total assets.
We calculated county-specific Herfindahl indexes as measures of concentration of the local retail deposit market. A Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of squared market shares.
We measured each institution's market share as a bank's deposits or 50 percent of a thrift's deposits divided by the sum of banks' deposits plus the sum of 50 percent of thrifts' deposits (as of June 30) within a county (or independent city) based on FDIC Summary of Deposits data.
These data are available online at <http://www2.fdic.gov/sod/>.
We used population density to control for cross-sectional differences across counties. Facts, 1990 Facts, , 2002 . Our study covers between 1,093 (in the year 2000) and 1,239 (in 1989) counties (and independent cities) per yearroughly one-third of the total. About two-thirds of the U.S. counties (independent cities included) did not have occupational credit unions (or no occupational credit unions that met the selection criteria outlined in Appendix A).
The county-specific credit-union participation rate was calculated as a weighted average over the participation rates of all credit unions in our dataset. We used the number of potential members to weight the participation rates.
There were 17 county-years where credit unions (that met the selection criteria outlined in Appendix A) existed but where the Herfindahl index was unity. These observations represent corner solutions and, hence, were eliminated from the dataset. There were no county-years were there were credit unions (of the specified type) but no banks.
Definitions of variables and underlying data sources are listed below. For data taken from the Report of Condition and Income for Credit Unions, produced by the National Credit Union Administration, the NCUA mnemonic is in brackets.
(1) Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of squared market shares of commercial banks anmd 50 percent of thrift deposits within a county based on total bank deposits plus 50 percent of thrift deposits. By definition, the Herfindahl index is greater than zero; its maximum value is one. (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990 ).
The regression results are presented in conditioning plots, as introduced by . Conditioning plots display the estimated partial impact of a chosen explanatory variable, with all other explanatory variables pegged to chosen constants. Because the intercept is not identified in this type of regression, only changes in the displayed partial impact (rather than the level itself) can be interpreted in an economically meaningful manner. The variable that is varied in a conditioning plot adopts only values that are actually observed in the neighborhood of the values at which the pegged explanatory variables are set. Specifically, when we peg a variable to its median value, only observations for which this variable adopts values within the closed interval spanned by the 25th and 75th percentiles are included in the conditioning plot. Similarly, when we peg a variable to the 25th (75th) percentile, only observations for which this variable is smaller (greater) than or equal to the median are included in the conditioning plot. From the thus chosen set of observations, we discard the 10 most extreme observations (on either side) of the variable varied in the conditioning plot before evaluating the estimated functional form for the displayed range of values. We use the linearity property from (C2) to derive confidence intervals for the partial impact on the dependent variable displayed in the conditioning plots, as suggested by .
In an analysis of variance, we estimate a restricted, additive version of model (C1) We estimate model (C4) using the backfitting algorithm suggested by Hastie and Tibshirani (1986) . Backfitting consists of alternating the steps changing. For the smoother matrix, we can write (Hastie and Tibshirani (1986, p. 120) ): 
'
The ordinary least squares equivalent to the smoother matrix S reads
We used this "smoother matrix" in the analysis of variance of Table 3 when testing the nonparametric model (C1) against the linear model (C8).
For model selection, we use M-plots, as developed by .
M-plots offer a graphical portrayal of the trade-off between the contributions of variance and bias to the mean squared error as the smoothing parameter, g , changes. The expected mean squared error summed over all observations and normalized by the variance, where ' f y R y is the residual sum of squares when the smoothing parameter is f . Because there is an approximate F-distribution for F as mentioned abovea probability distribution for ˆg M can be derived. Cleveland and Devlin argue that the smoothing parameter f , for which the bias of the fitted values is negligible, is "usually in the range of .2 to .4"; we chose 0.3 f = . Similar to the analysis of variance (C7), the M-plot method can easily be extended to linear models estimated with ordinary least squares.
Table 1
The Table 2 The table presents descriptive statistics for the credit union participation rate at the county (or independent city) level. This county-level credit union participation rate is defined as the weighted average of the participation rates of individual credit unions operating in a given county; the weights are derived from the number of potential credit union members. By definition, the participation rate is greater than zero; its maximum value is one. The descriptive statistics includes only counties that qualify for the quantitative analysis shown in 
Chart 1
The chart shows for the year 2001 a kernel estimate (thick line) of the logarithmic Herfindahl index of banking concentration at the county (or independent city). The Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of squares of market shares. The market shares are measured by the fraction of total bank deposits (as of June 30) within a county (or independent city) based on FDIC Summary of Deposits data for commercial banks and thrifts. We use a Gaussian kernel along with an (under the null of normal distribution) optimal bandwidth of 0.2 0.2 (4 / 3) T σ − ⋅ ⋅ , where T is the number of sample observations and σ is the sample standard deviation (Silverman, 1986) . The normal probability density (thin line) is the normal based on estimates of the sample mean and standard deviation. The whiskers indicate the dispersion of the observations on the horizontal axis. There is statistically significant skewness (0.196) but no significant excess kurtosis (-0.070).
Chart 2
The chart shows for the year 1989 a kernel estimate (thick line) of the logarithmic Herfindahl index of banking concentration at the county (or independent city). The Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of squares of market shares. The market shares are measured by the fraction of total bank deposits (as of June 30) within a county (or independent city) based on FDIC Summary of Deposits data for commercial banks and thrifts. We use a Gaussian kernel along with an (under the null of normal distribution) optimal bandwidth of 0.2 0.2 (4 / 3) T σ − ⋅ ⋅ , where T is the number of sample observations and σ is the sample standard deviation (Silverman, 1986) . The normal probability density (thin line) is the normal based on estimates of the sample mean and standard deviation. The whiskers indicate the dispersion of the observations on the horizontal axis. There is statistically significant skewness (-0.448) and excess kurtosis (0.420).
